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Making a new South African 
learner: An analysis of the 
South African schools act
Abstract
This paper interrogates the relationship between South Africa’s most 
important piece of educational policy, the South African Schools 
Act (SASA) (Republic of South Africa, 1996b), and learner identity. 
It seeks to understand how this central piece of South African 
educational legislation foreshadows, intersects with, foregrounds, 
prescribes and/or disturbs dominant notions of South African 
learner identity. What does the SASA say about the South African 
learner and particularly about what it expects the learner to be? 
The perspective used in this paper is that identity is constructed 
from history, memory, social and cultural institutions and power 
apparatuses. The specific interest of the paper is not to look so 
much at the mediation of identity in its practical forms, as in actual 
interchanges between subjects in the classroom, but to develop 
an understanding of the symbols and signifiers that are privileged 
in the formal and legal prescripts that surround the process of 
mediation. What significance this holds for the achievement of 
equality and justice in South Africa is what is explored here.
1. Introduction
The South African Schools Act (SASA) (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996b) promulgated in 1996 is one of the 
most important pieces of post-apartheid legislation. It 
put in place the critical elements required for building an 
educational system framed by the ideals of the South 
African constitution. It was not, however, without issues 
and questions. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
how it dealt with the challenging question of imagining new 
learner identities for South Africa’s young people. How did 
it challenge, disrupt and /or reconstitute dominant ideas 
of learner identity inherited out of apartheid? The issue 
stimulating this contribution is the challenge of the (re)
making of a social order for South Africa which enjoys the 
trust and commitment of the majority of its people. Apartheid 
had produced a social order that institutionalised power in 
particular kinds of ways. While there is an ongoing debate 
about the fundamental nature of that power, whether it was 
primarily racial, classed or gendered, there is no question 
that its symptomatic everyday expression took a racial 
form. That “everyday” – the classic quotidian – was about 
ordinary human beings being subjected to detailed sorting 
and differentiating and ranking and hierarchising processes 
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that began with their emplacement in tightly defined racial categories. Categorisation 
produced acute distress – the disfigurement of people both physically and psychologically. 
The physical space in which people found themselves was profoundly disfigured. It was 
deliberately made ugly. Its material and architectural semiotics, as Coetzer (2013) has argued, 
were encoded in often brutalist representations of self and other. Complementing this were 
psychological hurts inflicted on the minds of black people. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 
(Rose & Tunmer, 1975:266) was the apartheid government’s central instrument for effecting 
this trauma. Its chief architect, Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, later to become Prime Minister, 
described its purpose in the following way: 
There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of 
labour…. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim 
absorption in the European community where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has 
been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and 
misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not 
allowed to graze (ibid).
Karlsson (2003) has written of the ordering of the space of the school. Not sufficiently 
acknowledged is the physical and visceral effect produced by the apartheid form – the strategic 
modulation of bodies. How these processes work, the “race”-ing, “gendering”, “class”-ing and 
a whole host of other formative influences on the making of bodies and their outward identity 
manifestations, as part of the process of understanding what lies beneath them as suggested 
above with respect to the system’s fundamental power structure, has yet to be raised, explored 
and understood.1 In such an analysis, an attempt must be made to understand how colonial 
education as a pedagogical and learning experience worked. It is important to explore the 
experience of cognition in the racialised space of what we have come to understand by “white” 
classrooms, “African” classrooms and so-called coloured and Indian classrooms. What does 
it mean to teach and learn – to educate in the sense of “leading through spaces that are 
coded and marked with the signs of inferiority and superiority?” What does “education” mean 
in spaces such as these? This large task notwithstanding, there is consensus (see Christie 
& Collins, 1979) that apartheid education schooled young white people for dominance and 
young black people for subordination. From this form and substance came a normative order 
inflected in the register of distress – being subjected to intense scrutiny and surveillance 
through the South African “pass” system and finding oneself arrested and imprisoned for often 
bureaucratic violations produced for many South Africans a life of trauma.
In education, one of the first major policy initiatives taken by the post-apartheid government 
to turn this situation around was the passing of the South African Schools’ Act of 1996 (SASA). 
It brought together in a single bureaucracy the previously separate and racialised education 
sub-systems that served the country. Subsequently, legislation has been passed which has 
sought to standardise the curricula, governance and financing platforms from which individual 
schools move to achieve specific and commensurable outcomes in what all students 
learn and how they learn. The task of the post-apartheid government was to set in motion 
the processes for creating a new normative order. This was facilitated through the passing of 
a number of key pieces of legislation and policy instruments. In relation to the physical space 
of education, norms and standards baselines for the country were set. Their purpose was to 
prescribe equitable distribution criteria within the system to ensure that all learners had the 
1  The issue of identity and space was raised in a landmark exhibition, Setting Apart, in 1994 curated by Hilton 
Judin at the Castle of Cape Town.
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opportunity to receive a quality education. For this, the National Norms and Standards for 
School Funding (NNSSF) were prescribed by the then Minister of Education. They specified 
norms and standards for school infrastructure (e.g. electronic connectivity and recreational 
facilities), school capacity (e.g. classroom size), and learning and teaching support material 
(e.g. science apparatus, electronic equipment) to be provided by the government (Amended 
in NNSSF 2015). Norms and Standards were also set out in 2000 for Educators (NSE). These 
specified the knowledge, values and skills that an educator was expected to acquire. The NSE 
policies constituted an important attempt to reconstitute an educational system that had, as a 
result of apartheid, been fractured and hierarchised according to race, gender and class. They 
sought to put in place a new normative order.
While this policy has sought to accommodate social and cultural differences, in so far 
as governing councils at schools have been able to determine the media of instruction for 
their students, its thrust, driven by notions of equity and redress, has been to adumbrate the 
learning subject and his/her identity in the guise of the ideal South African. 
In the context of South Africa’s divided cultural, race, class and gender history, what policy 
documents say about the ideal South African has many implications for how South Africans 
manage their everyday lives, their relationships with each other and the society that they 
share. While this paper seeks not to pursue these implications, and wishes to defer that 
discussion to another occasion, it does wish to argue that it is important to recognise, locate 
and understand the privileged signs that are circulated in and around the polis. These signs, 
and in this case the sign of the ideal South African learning subject, provide an indication of 
the state’s understanding of who its citizens are, how their citizenship might be practised, and 
particularly the social and cultural spaces in which citizenship might be expressed.2 What 
limitations and possibilities inhere in this identity, and what is excluded from it, given South 
Africa’s complex social, cultural and economic history is an important question to be pursued.
The perspective used in this paper is that identity is constructed from history, memory, 
social and cultural institutions and power apparatuses. The specific interest of the paper is 
not to look so much at the mediation of identity in its practical forms, as in actual interchanges 
between subjects in the classroom, but to develop an understanding of the symbols and 
signifiers that are privileged in the formal and legal prescripts that surround the process of 
mediation. What significance this holds for the achievement of equality and justice in South 
Africa is what is explored here.
The theoretical basis for the paper is derived from post-modern debates around the 
unity (or the death) of the subject. Attention is given, in a brief overview, to the notion of the 
displaced and decentred subject. This platform is used to address the idea of the subject in 
the SASA of 1996 
The paper will examine SASA, the major policy instrument in education to have emanated 
from the state since 1994, and will use the tools of deconstruction to draw out the recurring 
2  A key site for the idealisation of South Africa’s new citizenship, and the identities within it, has been proffered 
in official and popular discussions about South Africa’s new “rainbow nation”. The concept of the rainbow 
nation, popularised by Archbishop Tutu, has occasioned much debate. For its supporters, the idea of the 
rainbow, expressed as it is in the metaphoric ambience of “newness”, “togetherness” and “harmony”, stands 
for the glorious arrival of the new multicultural South Africa after its tempestuous past. For its detractors, the 
concept of the rainbow, with its fixed and defined, colours, is all too reminiscent of South Africa’s racialised 
past. The rainbow is, for them, a celebration of the concept of race and is, on those grounds alone, an 
objectionable metaphor. 
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themes, dissonant chords and crosscutting frameworks that are contained within the 
document. The aim is not to achieve a complete and total analysis but to show through what 
Gasché (1995) calls the self-referentiality of the text, how the text is involved in processes of 
appropriation, denunciation and renunciation.
2. The theoretical frame
A concerted attempt is being made in a welter of policy documents, legislative enactments and 
other discursive devices to reimagine the South African identity. In the context of a colonial 
and apartheid history that systematically sought to inscribe South Africans racially, this attempt 
has as its objective the reformulation of the subject as a citizen framed by “(a) [h]uman dignity, 
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-
racialism and non-sexism...” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996a:3). This 
paper is interested in exploring the meaning of this new construction of citizenship as it is being 
articulated in planning and policy texts of the new South African state. It seeks specifically to 
work with the key text in education, the South African Schools Act (SASA) (Republic of South 
Africa [RSA], 1996b). The focus of the paper will be on notions of the learning subject that are 
embodied in the Act.3 Interestingly, a few commentaries that bear on questions of the identity 
of the child in the SASA exist. These, however, are neither explicit nor focused on the idea of 
learning as a framework for making sense of identity. An interesting example is the discussion 
on “child-centeredness” in the review of Reyneke (2016:4) on the need for the SASA to be 
changed to take heed of more strongly focused interpretations of child-rights.
The issues that this paper seeks to explore are connected with current debates around the 
culture of modernity and its embeddedness in the assumptions of the Enlightenment central to 
which is the efficacy of universal reason. The central issue, within the ensemble of questions 
that are raised within this discussion, is the status of modern civilisation and its search for 
a universal moral order informed by an intellectually self-actualising human race operating 
under the aegis of a universal human reason. Within this modern civilisation, the position 
of education is central. To it is accorded the responsibility of “educating reason”, of putting 
together a “universal education based on universal methods equally applicable to all nations 
and cultures and of a mass education operating on the principle of merit that would equip 
individuals with the necessary skills, attitudes and attributes to become useful citizens and 
good workers” (Peters, 1996:2). From this process is expected to emerge the universal citizen 
ready and equipped to be “the agent of historically progressive change” (Peters, 1996:2).4
Conceptions of this modern condition, premised as they are on a new universalism of 
morals, values and understandings, and on a notion of a unitary rational subject, have been 
challenged for their dogmatism and their colonisation of the right to “truth-making”. Post-
modern5 critics have been profoundly “incredulous” with respect to the project of modernity 
3  Learners, of course, are not the only “subjects” in the Act. Important and interesting subjects for analysis are 
teachers and learners who have been “captured” in particular guises and who, in relation to learners, present 
a particular ensemble of types. 
4  Working with the idea of universal reason and its projection into material contexts, one has to be aware, 
of course, of actual historical subjects – actual learners – and the influences and factors at play in their 
formation. This analysis seeks to work with the juridical – the law – here as one such factor. 
5  Aware that a distinction is sometimes made, particularly to emphasise notions of difference and the notion of 
the “death of the subject”, I will use the term post-modern in this paper to include post-structuralist traditions 
of analysis.
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and have taken issue with claims that it addresses all of humankind, speaks on behalf of all 
humankind and has the interests of all humankind at its philosophical heart. Gasché (1995:16), 
drawing on Derrida, makes the point that the singular subject, presented as singularity, and 
as the bearer of the ideals of universalism, has to be protected from differences in philosophic 
interpretation. This protection is achieved through “repeated inscription”. Singularity, 
by refusing all translation and interpretation becomes opaque, silent or immediate in a 
non-dialectic sense. It becomes quite simply thoroughly unintelligible. Such a singular 
would be a failure in its own terms. No longer identifiable, it could not be recognized, let 
alone repeated as a singular. For the singular to be possible as a singularity, it must pose 
itself as singular, that is, it must repeat itself in an idealizing doubling. Differently put, to 
be repeatable, the singular must translate itself, interpret itself as intelligible in its own 
unintelligibility (Gasché, 1995:14).
In translating, transposing and repeating itself, the singular subject is required to 
demarcate itself from the very thing that it is not. It is in this demarcation that it becomes 
readable. As Derrida (quoted in Gasché, 1995:15) says, for demarcation, “[i]t is necessary 
that the unrepeatable be repeated in it”. From this emerges a necessary idealisation and 
universalisation, “which at the same time betrays it” (Gasché, 1995:15). The sovereign subject 
in this construction is thus always and ever only possible in the presence of the other. 
What the pose of universalism and the presentation of a unitary subject serve to do is 
assert “truth” from the perspective of the discourse of the Enlightenment while silencing and 
excluding the other. At the forefront of these critiques have been post-structuralist thinkers 
such as Lyotard, Derrida and Foucault. Lyotard (1984), for example, challenged the grand 
narratives of modernity such as the “emancipation of humanity” and “the unity of knowledge” 
as metanarratives glossed in the language of totality seeking to assume the status of 
transcendental paradigms. Talking about how prefaces are used in texts, difference, Derrida 
argued, was sublimated and repressed in this narrative system (see Derrida, 1981:45). What 
the texts do is to internalise and domesticate leftover issues.
In contrast to the tropes of Enlightenment, post-modernists have been concerned to inaugurate 
a discourse that is,
[about] a putative anti [or post] epistemological standpoint, antiessentialism, antirealism 
about meaning and reference, antifoundationalism, a suspicion of transcendental 
arguments and viewpoints, the rejection of the picture of knowledge as accurate 
representation, the rejection of truth as correspondence to reality, the rejection of 
canonical descriptions and final vocabularies and, finally, a suspicion of metanarratives 
(Peters, 1995:3).
Post-modernists seek to speak in terms of the provisional and the contingent, to eschew 
the power of universal rationality and to recognise in the Enlightenment the cultural and 
economic procedures and apparati which have come to dominate the world. They argue 
that, “the cultural value of the Enlightenment – and of the process of modernization – linking 
subjective freedom to a “scientific” reason “conceals a will to power that ultimately binds the 
individual to the technological apparatus” (David Ingram quoted in Peters, 1995:5).
In post-modern thought, structural linguistics is used as the vehicle to mount an attack 
on rationality. Derrida, for example, draws on Saussurean linguistics to show that language 
is built on the arbitrary connection between the signifier and the signified. He seeks to make 
the point that in the Western tradition “the formal essence of the signified is presence and the 
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privilege of its proximity to the logos as phonè is the privilege of presence” (Derrida, quoted 
in Peters, 1995:6). He goes on to say that Western philosophy has privileged the meaning 
of being in general as presence – a self-identical, transparent self-presence. Philosophy 
has tried to freeze the play of différance and to invoke what Peters (1995:6) calls “clear and 
distinct ideas, ideal Platonic forms, an ultimate referent or ‘transcendental signified,’ absolute 
knowledge... within closed systems of truth”. Derrida argues that such closure is impossible 
simply because philosophy cannot reach beyond language. The claim to have escaped the 
boundary of language depends on “excluding or assimilating whatever escapes the grids 
of intelligibility it imposes on the movement of différance” (Ibid). In Derrida’s language, 
philosophy is predicated on logo- and homocentric conceits that are incapable of recognising 
the play of différance. The significance of this line of thought is deeply subversive of the 
project of positivist philosophy that claims for itself the ability to define and describe in terms 
of unitary and stable phenomena that, as Derrida argues, might take their meaning outside of 
the frontiers of linguistic description (see Derrida, 1981:328).
What I will attempt to do in this paper, following tentatively in the procedure of deconstruction 
offered by Derrida, is to reduce the sign’s “originality and originarity” (Gasché, 1995:38), and, 
in a sense, its ideality. What this accomplishes, as Derrida says, is to show how much ideality 
depends on the sign and how much tension and contradiction there is within the sign, for 
within the sign are both presence and absence. Self-reflection of the presence is only possible 
in the presence of the absence. This work seeks to argue that the articulation of presence 
is inherently political, constructing, as it does, hierarchies of position in which that which is 
absented is simultaneously also disprivileged.
3. Identity in the South African Schools Act
The SASA is the framing document for school education in South Africa. Its various chapters 
include, inter alia, the following: “The Learner”; “Public Schools” (this chapter describes the 
public school in its ownership dimensions, its governance provisions, who has responsibility 
for what aspects of managing and governing the school); the “Funding of Public Schools” and 
the “Private Schools”. The Act is meant to provide a general and comprehensive framework 
for the management of the restructuring of South African education and emanated, principally, 
from an investigation conducted under the leadership of Peter Hunter, an academic at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. In the Preamble to the Act, broad general principles are set 
out. The Act is presented as a statement of the new state’s intentions to,
provide an education of progressively high quality for all learners and in so doing lay a 
strong foundation for the development of all our people’s talents and capabilities, advance 
the democratic transformation of society, combat racism and sexism and all other forms 
of unfair discrimination and intolerance, contribute to the eradication of poverty and the 
economic well-being of society, protect and advance our diverse cultures and languages, 
uphold the rights of all learners, parents and educators, and promote their acceptance of 
responsibility for the organisation, governance and funding of schools in partnership with 
the state (RSA, 1996b:2) (All italics in the original).
The central political preoccupation of the Act is that of the re-storation of form – it is 
“[t]o provide a uniform system for the organisation, governance and funding of schools” 
(RSA, 1996b:2; my emphasis). The new system is predicated in the form and structure of an 
integrated system inhabited by “learners”, “parents” and “educators” who are the subjects of 
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education and the subjects for education. To them fall the rights to be derived from the new 
system and the responsibilities for making it what it should be.
Embedded explicitly in the preamble is the shape of the old system and its disfiguring 
history. The past is presented as having been “consigned to history”.
In terms of this preoccupation with re-forming the system, the first strategic move that 
the Act makes is to present the subject of the learning process as the learner. After the Act 
proceeds through its formalistic definition of the terms that it uses, it focuses its attention on 
this learning-subject. I want to argue now, in seeking to make sense of this learning subject, 
that far from being consigned to history, the past is intensely present in the construction of the 
subjectivity of this learning-subject.
The subject of the learning process in South African schools has an interesting history. 
S/he has been variously described as a pupil, scholar and latterly as a student. The significance 
of these terms is buried in the complexity of the social and cultural frameworks which have 
permeated and diffused through the South African landscape and have, drawing on Gasché’s 
(1995:5) comments about deconstruction, come to signify what one might understand to be 
“unities of sense” rather than simply “regular” uses of a mark or a sign.
The learning-subject as invoked in the Act is given a defining singularity. It is projected as 
“any person receiving or obliged to receive education” (RSA, 1996b:4). If we are to understand 
“unities” as implying a bringing together of what was not previously unified, then the learner 
clearly cannot be understood to be an innocent representation of the “learning” subject. 
Instead, s/he has to be understood as a moment, or a subject, which, as Bhabha (1994:8) 
says, is “blasted out of the continuum of history”. 
The conditions of the production of this term, I want to argue, are located inside the history 
of learning in South Africa, particularly in the detachment of the learning subject from the very 
act of what has traditionally and conventionally been understood as learning. The conditions 
which currently prevail in South African schools and which emerge from the country’s almost 
twenty-five year long experience of the decomposition of formal schooling have been pre-
eminently about the displacement of the learning-subject in the traditional couplet of teacher-
learner and, indeed, the emergence of very different teacher-learner arrangements. In this 
twenty-five year long period, to the learning-subject has fallen rights and responsibilities that 
have more regularly been the preserve of others, such as teachers, parents, elders and so on. 
The learning-subject, for example, has assumed, in various ways and forms, the responsibility 
for determining the length of the school day, what qualities are desirable in a teacher and, even, 
what should be taught. This subject has thus been the primary agent in the process of defining 
the character of the modern South African school. S/he has positioned the school as a site 
for political socialisation and the taking on of political responsibility (see Gilmour, Soudien & 
Donald, 2000). Out of this history have come learning-subjects who have rewritten the laws and 
codes of schooling and who have effectively taken upon themselves the responsibility of taking 
hold of the educational space of the school and effectively specify its character and mission.
The present Act has, in its own discursive way, the historic task of decentring and displacing 
and then replacing and recentring these arrangements. The recent history of schooling has 
projected the learning-subject as the author of political activity – encoded as a student in the 
discursive tradition of Paris, 1968 and the radical student movement in the United States in 
the late sixties and early seventies – and as an actor outside of the traditional institutional 
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pedagogical frame who decides for him-/herself what appropriate learning constitutes. The 
task of the new state is to establish the proper order in which this learning subject is to function, 
to define and to relegitimate the social and pedagogical hierarchy in which this learning is to 
take place. 
The new Act situates learners, I contend, as “receivers of education” and as people 
“obliged to receive education”. From being the makers of the school environment, they are 
projected now as subjected beneficiaries – the “receivers” of this environment. The intention 
of the Act is to displace the power of giving and receiving in the school environment.
At stake in this form of analysis is recognising the strategies of representation in the text, 
particularly the ways in which the subject is staged. Gasché (1995:27) talks of the hyperbolic 
way in which emblems come to inscribe the whole. This is evident in the ways in which the 
learning-subject is totalised in terms of age, juristic personality and family position. S/he, for 
example, is presented as someone who is between the ages of seven and fifteen years. The 
subject is presented as the ward of a parent who is obliged to take his or her learning-subject 
to school – s/he is the “responsibility” of a parent. The parent is him-/herself specified in 
relation to the learning-subject as someone who has the obligation of keeping the learning-
subject in school, and where s/he fails to do so is him-/herself open to/subject to investigation. 
Emphasis is placed in the text on the minor status of the learning subject who is firmly located 
within the safety of a structured family to whom is accorded and from whom is expected the 
performance of particular functions. It is not with the learning-subject but with the family that 
agency, choice and responsibility lie.
This development is repeated later in the Act when admission to the public school is 
discussed. The Act makes clear that the learning-subject’s rights of admission to a school are 
pre-determined in relation to his parent’s class, religious and juristic status. The Act states 
that, “no learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that his or 
her parents cannot pay the school fees, do not subscribe to the mission statement of the 
school or refuse to enter into a contract with the school in terms of which they waive claims 
for damages which may arise out of the education of the child” (RSA, 1996b:6; italics in the 
original). The learning-subject is accorded rights in relation to his or her parents.
A similar move to the above takes place in relation to the learning-subject and his or her 
place in the school. The Act emphasises that a “public school must admit learners and serve 
their educational requirements without unfairly discriminating in any way” (RSA, 1996b:6). 
Aside from centring learning in the school (and not the learning-subject); learning as an 
activity is projected in a deterministic and top-down fashion. The school is awarded the sole 
responsibility for designing and managing learning. The learning-subject is again positioned 
as the passive player within the relationship. The Act speaks of the learning requirements 
of the subject being served to the learning-subject. Implied in this formulation is the notion 
of a dependent in relation to an unproblematised and all-understanding power. In invoking 
school as the authority, it is assumed that this authority is self-evident and is beyond the need 
of reference. More, and in addition, “educational requirements” are spoken of as if they are 
obvious, already defined and available as a pre-packed commodity. 
State policy is specified in the Act in relation to language and religion. The Act makes 
clear that “no form of racial discrimination may be practised in implementing policy under 
this section” (RSA, 1996b:8). It also makes clear that attendance at religious observances 
at schools is entirely voluntary. Crucially, however, in these sections, the learning-subject is 
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rendered largely invisible. School is addressed spatially only – it is a place where unspecified 
things happen – and it is only in relation to religious observance that “learners and members 
of staff” are specified.
The strategic staging that takes place in this text, it could be suggested, is around the 
framing of the subject as a derivative of either his or her parents or the school. The learning-
subject is consistently described in a subordinate relation to his/her parents and the school. 
The rights that the subject has access to are rights that accrue via his or her parents. 
Critically, the only time the learning-subject is decoupled from these significant others are 
when the Act addresses the learning-subject as a subject of the school’s code of conduct 
and when the Act speaks of the establishment of a “representative council of learners”. The 
Act requires that a school adopt a Code of Conduct which “must be aimed at establishing a 
disciplined and purposeful school environment, dedicated to the improvement and maintenance 
of the quality of the learning process” (SASA, 1996:8). It also requires that all schools enrolling 
“learners in the eighth grade and higher” have to establish learner representative councils. 
The Act makes clear that there can be no reason that exempts the learning-subject from 
the provisions of the Code of Conduct: “Nothing,” it says, “contained in this Act exempts a 
learner from the obligation to comply with the code of conduct of the school attended by such 
a learner” (RSA, 1996b:8). The Act emphasises how important the Code of Conduct is for 
“safeguarding” the interests of the learner (my emphases). 
This process of decoupling occurs again when the learning-subject is positioned in relation 
to processes of suspension and expulsion from school. The subject is addressed directly 
in these provisions and is presented as a person in his or her own right who is accorded 
the status of an individual and is the subject of autonomous action distinct from his or her 
parents. The juxtaposition of this discourse of the law of subjects alongside of the pedagogical 
discourses in the school here makes for interesting analyses. What is most apparent is how 
the language and the framing devices shift when the focus of attention moves to question of 
law and punishment.
The subject is approached in this part of the Act as one who is entitled to a “fair hearing” 
and is deemed to be able, at this point, to take responsibility for his or her actions. To the 
subject is accorded speaking rights. Significantly, however, the subject is also presented 
as one to whom corporal punishment may not be administered.6 Rights and responsibilities 
inhere directly in the person of the subject. His or her behaviour is described as his or her 
responsibility. This behaviour is normed and standardised and “correctional measure(s)” can 
be applied to it. These measures, it is assumed, are measures that appeal to the speaking 
subject. S/he is able to receive that which the society has to offer and to make good of it. 
Significantly, however, the capacity of the subject to speak – his or her autonomy – is 
modified when it comes to seeking redress. The learning-subject is required to seek relief from 
interpretation of the law through, mainly, the person of his or her parent. The learning-subject 
is accorded the right to “appeal against a decision” which results in his or her expulsion or 
suspension from a school. 
6  This provision has caused a great deal of confusion in the schools and has, I suspect, come to be widely 
ignored. Teachers and parents have complained about their “authority” being usurped by the state. What this 
raises are interesting questions about the discourse of punishment and authority and the framing of subjects 
within it, and the perceived dissonance with liberal discourse around practices of disciplining.
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This autonomy is similarly proscribed, one might argue, when the Act talks to the learner 
representative councils. It states that they are to be established by the provincial minister of 
education who will specify their functions.
4. Conclusion
Deconstruction, as Gasché (1995:35) reminds, is important for decoding the significatory 
practices in a text, i.e., accounting for the presences and the absences in a text. In response 
to the question why it is important to work textually with policy documents, my answer would 
be that texts such as the SASA are profoundly important in holding up to us that which its 
authors7 wish us to be and also that which they wish us not to be. In using the approach 
of deconstruction, it is important to see that it makes possible not only the recognition of 
contradiction, but fundamentally also the recognition of the deployment of power. Identity-
framing strategies are an important expression of this power.
Following this, how might one begin to understand the identity, and its conditions of 
production, of the learning-subject as it is framed in the Act? The argument I want to make 
is that these conditions of production are profoundly historical. The central significatory move 
that the Act makes is to stage the learner as a not-yet-adult. Its principal ambition is to present 
the learning-subject as a subject of education. Subjectivity in this development is, moreover, 
encoded doubly in the text. It is framed in the traditional Western epistemological tradition as 
the autonomous and rational subject, but also as the subjected subject. It is in this duality that 
the text reveals that which is privileged as presence and that which is disprivileged as absence. 
I want to argue that the primary objective of the Act is to restore the form of the school 
and the identities of those who inhabit it. This form is central to the historic destiny of the 
modern South African school8. Many of the strategic devices the Act invokes are about 
asserting this form. The learning-subject is presented as a learner or as one who has begun a 
process of obtaining membership but has not yet, classically, passed the major test to achieve 
membership. Membership in this context refers specifically to that of South African citizenship. 
This citizenship is a citizenship of responsibility. The learning-subject is framed here as being 
tutored towards the achievement of this membership. An identity of tutelage is thus the 
fundamental characteristic that is to be displayed by the learning-subject. The Act seeks to 
specify how this tutelage is to be managed and repeats the inscription of tutelage through 
inflecting the learning-subject repeatedly in subordinate terms. This inscription becomes self-
referential and is managed through the decentring of the learning-subject in relation to the 
state, the school, parents and teachers. At each stage of the process of inscription of the 
identity of the learning-subject in the Act, even when it refers to moments when the learning-
subject is to take self-responsibility, the subject is framed in a state of tutelage. Even the 
requirement of the school to establish a Code of Conduct is about the establishment of a 
“disciplined and purposeful school environment” (RSA, 1996b:8) (italics in the original).
What is this tutelage all about? Tutelage in the Act is about restoring to South Africa the 
correct order of things and bringing it into a state of alignment with the rest of the ordered 
world, as opposed to the disordered world. In this order, subjectivity is obtained through the 
7  I use authors in the double sense here. I refer to the actual authors, i.e. those who created and encrypted the 
document, and those who legally authorised it, i.e. the government and the lawmakers of the day.
8  This destiny has, of course, been represented in a number of ways, not least of all in the functionalist and 
class-reproductive language of the sociology of education.
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subjection of the subject. Young people enter the world of adulthood through the experience 
of their parents. Of course, this is a little different to the protocols of any other society. In this 
process, however, the text of modernity is privileged and re-iterated. The subject of modernity 
is also, unlike his or her pre-modern counter-part (and even a-modern and, therefore, deviant 
counterpart), the subject of education. He or she cannot be permitted to define the conditions 
of his or her own socialisation independently of the master narratives that authorise the 
correct and appropriate order, sequencing and framing of the stages through which young 
people move towards autonomy and responsibility. Feared and, therefore, rejected in the 
world that young people make themselves are “ignorance”, and the proper understanding of 
their place in the modern world. The cognitive framework in which the subject is socialised 
is, instead, pre-eminently that of rationality. Rationality, as the process suggests, is acquired 
through being a learner. 
What is displaced, however, or rather is sought to be displaced, in these constructions are 
non-Western and non-traditional forms of learning. The form of learning that young people in 
South Africa have developed for themselves in the past twenty-five years is the practice of a 
dangerous other. Young people, and this discussion recognises the demarcation that the term 
young people9 invokes, have, for good or bad, taken responsibility for their identities in ways 
which the positivist turn in Western philosophy and its application as a principle of schooling 
have denied.10 Young people have come to take on roles as producers of knowledge that 
dominant idealisations of youth do not recognise. This identity, in as much as it has come 
to shape the meaning of the idealised tutored South African subject, is arguably, and for 
whatever reason, not recognised in the Act. The effect of this is that in projecting itself to the 
mass of South Africa’s learning-subjects, it makes itself audible only to the minority, i.e., the 
middle-class whose learning identities are constructed in the paradigmatic frame of subjected 
learning subjects. In the process, this privileged discourse talks past those whose histories 
are inscribed outside of the symbolic economy of the Act.
In constructing a new unity of meaning for the subject around the condition of tutelage, the 
Act cannot but invoke the identity of the dangerous other that it wishes to keep out of the new 
South Africa. It is in this very act of displacing and decentring the other, however, that the new 
South Africa and the new identities within it presents themselves as profoundly discriminatory 
moments of history and opens up opportunities for new struggles as the other continues to 
announce itself and calls for recognition. Called for, I would argue, is a more historically aware 
framing of the learner that acknowledges the significant developments that have taken place 
in South Africa over the last fifty years through which young people’s agency has dramatically 
come to the fore. Such an acknowledgement would need to work critically with the idea of 
agency. It would not wish to privilege youth agency over other interests in the making of a new 
normative order but it would have to assist in the process of thinking how such an agency is 
made a productive feature of learning experiences and how new and vital learning identities are 
shepherded into being in a learning landscape that insufficiently honours the value of learning.
9  I am not oblivious to the critique that would pose questions about the distinctions that are made between 
children and adolescents and the pedagogical and psychological debates that surround the use of terms such 
as these.
10  Discussions of the difference between modernity and post-modernity often include the point that the 
transgressive logic of post-modernism has the same end-point as rationality. Rationality is not bounded and 
always seeks to overturn itself. 
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